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PROBLEMS OF MODERN ECONOMICS, N 4 (64), 2017
ISSUES OF ECONOMIC THEORY. MACROECONOMICS
Mierin L. A.
Chair of the National Economics, St. Petersburg State University of Economics, PhD (Economics), Professor
Vinokurov S. S.
Assistant Professor, Chair of the National Economics, St. Petersburg State University of Economics, PhD (Economics)
Medved A. A.
, Assistant Professor, Chair of the National Economics, St. Petersburg State University of Economics, PhD (Economics)

Modelling of informational aspects of decision making on the market of capital (Russia, St. Petersburg)
The article analyzes the major concepts of the economic theory that take into account the imperfect nature of information available to economic subjects in the process of decision making. The authors discuss the concepts of “rational lack of attention,” “sticky” information, interaction between “agents” and “principals,” social channels of information distribution. Review of the existing concepts allows the authors to make a conclusion on the necessity to take the informational factor into account in the process of macroeconomic modelling, forecasting and development of the state economic politics
Key words: market of capital, imperfect nature of information, decision making on the market of capital, economic politics
Pages: 54 - 58



Ïóáëèêàöèÿ ïîäãîòîâëåíà â ðàìêàõ íàó÷íî-èññëåäîâàòåëüñêîé ðàáîòû, âûïîëíåííîé ïðè ôèíàíñîâîé ïîääåðæêå ÑÏáÃÝÓ

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